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The concept of politeness has been of utility to contemporaries and historians of eighteenth-century 
England alike, and has proved particularly central to understanding contemporary sociability. 1 However, 
its impact on religious coexistence has been less well explored. Proponents of politeness in the first half 
of the eighteenth century suggested that as a mode of social interaction it facilitated cohesion. As a 
result, the culture of politeness has generally been dissociated from narratives of continuing religious 
division in this period, with an historiographical emphasis on the importance of the emergence of a 
‘more polite’ and socially affable religious culture that marked a departure from the divisions of the 
previous century.2 Interpreted in this way, the dominant social discourses of the eighteenth century 
should have tempered religious divisions. This article demonstrates that when applied to Protestant 
Dissenters from the Established Church, the rhetoric of politeness did quite the opposite. 
 
                                               
1 Lawrence Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpretation of the British Eighteenth Century’, Historical Journal 45:4 
(2002), pp.898, 877. 
2 Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpretation of the British Eighteenth Century’, p. 890; Jorge Arditi, ‘Hegemony and 
Etiquette: An Exploration on the Transformation of Practice and Power in Eighteenth-Century England’, British 
Journal of Sociology 45:2 (1994), p.178. 
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The so-called “Toleration” Act of 1689 meant that for the first time Protestant Dissenters from the 
Church of England could worship separately in their own meeting houses. However, as has been widely 
recognised in recent historiography, the legislation of 1689 did not have the transformative impact on 
the nature of religious coexistence that had long been supposed. For many Dissenters it was a half 
victory. The Test and Corporation Acts, barring Dissenters from public office, remained in place, and the 
1689 Act gave very little practical guidance on where Dissenting congregations and ministers might fit 
into the functions of the community at large.3 It was open to interpretation whether the Act accepted 
the principle of liberty of conscience, or was merely a means of controlling Protestant Dissent within an 
essentially intolerant framework.  Where Dissenters saw the Toleration Act as indicative of a state 
acceptance of Dissent, High-Churchmen saw freedom of worship as the indulgent limit of any concession 
to Dissent.4 While the legislation of 1689 allowed a certain degree of freedom from persecution for 
Dissenters, Dissent was by no means a universally accepted aspect of the religious landscape in the first 
half of the eighteenth century. The Toleration Act, by legitimising Dissent but making the position of 
Dissenters in civil society unclear, opened up space for debate about the relationship between Church, 
State, and Dissenter. The official legal status of Dissenters had changed; their broader social and cultural 
status was uncertain. 
 
In the light of this, it is essential to understand the relationship between continuing religious divisions 
and the social and cultural developments of the early eighteenth century. Although the legal status of 
Dissenters had become more difficult to challenge, social ostracism remained an important weapon for 
opponents of Dissent. In this context, the religiously-inflected use of social discourses in this period 
turned politeness into more of a tool for division than concord. This article therefore emphasises the 
inherent exclusivity of the language of politeness. In doing so, it highlights the new perspectives that 
may emerge from using the lens of religious coexistence to examine the cultural and social life of the 
eighteenth century. 
 
The following discussion is organised around analysis of the impact of politeness on portrayals of Dissent 
and Dissenters’ own attempts to navigate their place in society after the Toleration Act. With a 
particular focus on the label of hypocrisy, the first section explores the influence of politeness on 
                                               
3 Ralph Stevens, ‘Anglican Responses to the Toleration Act, 1689-1714’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge, June 2014), pp.4-5, 11, 17. 
4 Andrew Thompson, ‘Contesting the Test Act: Dissent, Parliament and the Public in the 1730s’, Parliamentary 
History 24:1 (2005), pp.58, 61, 71. 
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characterisations of Dissenters in contemporary print and visual culture. While hypocrisy was but one of 
a number of charges laid against Dissenters from the seventeenth-century onwards, it is important here 
because the concept of politeness heightened concerns about the danger of hypocrisy in social 
interaction. The relationship between hypocrisy and politeness is explored in detail in the second 
section, which uses printed discussions of hypocrisy to highlight how the charge of impolite hypocrisy 
became particularly potent against Dissenters in this context. The third section demonstrates how the 
difficulties that this created for Dissenters played out in their attempts to balance polite social 
integration with the maintenance of their distinctive religious identity. Using both printed debates 
between Dissenters, and manuscript accounts of individuals’ attempts to navigate the social landscape, 
it demonstrates that Dissenters were acutely aware of the danger that polite behaviour might worsen 
the charges of hypocrisy already laid against them.  
 
This is not a comprehensive summary of the relationship between politeness and religious coexistence 
in eighteenth-century England. In confining itself to Protestant Dissent, this article discusses primarily 
Presbyterians, Independents, and Baptists, who, despite their clear differences, had sufficient collective 
identity as “Dissenters” to form a committee of ‘Protestant Dissenting Deputies’ in 1732.5 The 
experiences of Quakers and Catholics are not examined, although a similar study of these groups might 
prove productive. Nevertheless, in line with recent calls for greater conversation between study of 
eighteenth-century religion, society, and culture, this article flags the importance of thinking about 
particular issues of religious coexistence when examining sociability in general.6  
 
 
I 
 
Throughout the seventeenth century, “puritans” and Dissenters from the Established Church had been 
labelled as socially rigid, divisive, and hypocritical individuals.7 These supposed attributes of the hotter 
                                               
5 James E. Bradley, ‘The Public, Parliament and the Protestant Dissenting Deputies, 1732-1740’, Parliamentary 
History, 24:1 (2005), p.72. 
6 Jeremy Gregory, ‘Introduction: Transforming “the Age of Reason” into “an Age of Faiths”: or, Putting Religions 
and Beliefs (back) into the Eighteenth Century’, Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 32:3 (2009), pp.289-90. 
7 Patrick Collinson, ‘Antipuritanism’ in John Coffey and Paul C. H. Lim (eds), The Cambridge Companion to 
Puritanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.27-8. 
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sort of Protestant were consistently adapted to changing social and political purposes.8 These labels 
therefore indicate not just the nature of prejudices against Dissenters, but also the relationship between 
religion and discourses about sociability. In the context of the eighteenth century hackneyed 
characterisations of Dissenters became entangled with emergent discourses about politeness in the 
uncertain aftermath of the Toleration Act. The resulting picture of Dissenters as impolite hypocrites 
demonstrates the extent to which new and apparently inclusive social discourses, such as politeness, 
could be used to perpetuate the religious divisions of the Reformation well into the eighteenth century. 
 
Historians of politeness have emphasised that as a discourse associated with socially agreeable 
behaviour, it emerged in rejection of the excess of the previous century. As part of this, ‘sociability and 
manners in religion were urged as alternatives to enthusiasm and fanaticism’.9 Yet at least one label 
used against Dissenters - that of the hypocrite - became more, rather than less, potent when used in the 
context of the idealisation of politeness. Politeness could itself be regarded as inherently hypocritical, 
because it prioritised comely social behaviour over expression of true feeling, and concern about this 
featured in eighteenth-century discussions of polite education.10 However, proponents of politeness 
argued that as long as manners were cultivated alongside taste and natural theology, hypocrisy could be 
avoided.11 Indeed, for its advocates, this was a mode of conduct in which ‘social actors establish a trust 
that allows them then to tell the truth, to criticise, and to urge reforms on others without offending 
them’.12 
 
This view of politeness as a means to promote truth and virtue as well as social ease could be used to 
interpret the supposed ill-manners of Dissenters as symptomatic of hypocrisy. The arch-advocate of 
polite manners, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, made it clear that the ill humour of 
those who insisted on strictness and rigidity in discussing religious matters was not only impolite, but 
was in itself a sign of hypocrisy. He argued that religious matters should be treated with ‘good humour’ 
                                               
8 Peter Lake, ‘Anti-Puritanism: The Structure of a Prejudice’ in Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake (eds), Religious 
Politics in Post-Reformation England. Essays in Honour of Nicholas Tyacke (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006), 
pp.81-2, 87. 
9 Klein, ‘Politeness and the interpretation of the British eighteenth century’, pp.874, 875. 
10 Jenny Davidson, Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness. Manners and Morals from Locke to Austen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.46. 
11 Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Politeness and politics in the reigns of Anne and the early Hanoverians’ in J. G. A. Pocock, 
Gordon J. Schochet, and Lois Schwoerer (eds), The Varieties of British Political Thought, 1500-1800 (New York and 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.225. 
12 Klein, ‘Politeness and the interpretation of the British eighteenth century’, p.890. 
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and religious principles examined with ‘freedom and familiarity…If it be spurious or mixed with any 
other imposture, it will be detected and exposed’.13 Excessive rigidity in religion was thus not a sign of 
honesty, but an indication of an unwillingness to subject it to free examination. Shaftesbury was by no 
means unsympathetic towards Dissent; his views expressed a general distaste for rigidity and fanaticism 
in social discourse, rather than a specific criticism of Dissent. However, his position was symptomatic of 
a broader emphasis in this period on good manners in religion that could be used to attack the position 
of Dissent. The view that, in a truly polite person, religion and manners are consonant with one another 
was also propounded by the author of The Female Spectator, Eliza Haywood, when she instructed that 
‘true Religion and Good Manners, which are built upon a solid and unshaken Foundation, are always 
uniform and constant’.14 If Dissenters failed to subscribe to contemporary expectations of social 
behaviour, instead distinguishing themselves through a strict outward piety, they were demonstrating 
hypocritical and self-interested zeal that would force others to ‘suffer the Chagrin’ of their ‘ill-humour’.15 
 
This was a view propagated with vehemence in contemporary “character” literature, which frequently 
included descriptions of Dissenters. This genre, developed in the first half of the seventeenth century 
and popular well into the eighteenth, is useful for examining how the label of the hypocrite was used 
and re-adapted in the light of new social discourses.16 It should nevertheless be treated with care. In 
providing short snapshots of contemporary “types”, character literature tends to provide exaggerated 
generalisations, emphasising representations rather than relationships. Its significance therefore lies in 
the insights it provides into what authors thought their readers would identify as the commonly 
recognised characteristics of a type. 
 
The idea of a Dissenter as an ill-humoured hypocrite is evident in Thomas Brown’s 1705 Legacy for the 
ladies, which contains a biting description of the ‘pretended Godly woman’, who uses religion as a cover 
for licentiousness, acts as a cuckold to her husband, and ‘owns no other neighbour but those of her own 
profession’.17 Similar themes appear in Ned Ward’s character of ‘The formal Precision; or, The devout 
Lady’ in his 1708 Modern world disrob’d. Not only was such a lady over-formal in her posture and 
                                               
13 Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (London: 1708), pp.49-50. 
14 Eliza Haywood, The Female Spectator (London: 1745-6), Vol. 4, p.326. 
15 Jean Baptiste Morvan de Bellegarde, Reflexions Upon the Politeness of Manners; with Maxims for Civil Society 
(London: 1707), p.146. 
16 Jim Daems, Seventeenth-Century Literature and Culture (London: Continuum, 2006), p.74. 
17 Thomas Brown, A Legacy for the Ladies, or Characters of the Women of the Age (London: 1705), pp.16-24. 
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appearance, but she was profane in private and unsuited to general society: she was ‘only a fit 
Companion for a formal Hypocrite...an agreeable Wife to a miserly Enthusiast’.18 These themes were 
reproduced and adapted repeatedly elsewhere.19 For these authors, the vice of those they described 
was two-fold: Dissenters were socially exclusive and unable to conform to social expectation; they were 
also licentious in their private behaviour. 
 
This notion drew on a long legacy of characterisation of Dissenters that had begun with John Earle’s 
character of the ‘She precise Hypocrite’ in 1628. Earle described ‘a Nonconformist’ whose ‘puritie 
consists much in her Linnen’.20 He emphasised that she makes an outward show of religion, but has no 
real religious understanding whatsoever. Thus ‘Her devotion at the Church is much in the turning up of 
her eye’, and she ‘over flowes so with the Bible, that she spils it upon every occasion’.21 Furthermore, 
her pretences to purity and unorthodox religious views made her a social nuisance, who ‘rayles at other 
Women’.22 She was an enemy to merriment, and ‘is more fiery against the May-pole then her 
Husband’.23 For Earle, the female religious nonconformist was both empty of religion and troublesome 
to society through behaviour that went against social and gender norms. 
 
Earle’s text and ideas were recycled across the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century.24 However, 
in eighteenth-century versions, the influence of concerns about fashion and politeness rise to the 
surface. The description of ‘A female hypocrite, or devil in disguise’ in The true characters (1708), for 
instance, clearly drew on Earle, using phrases such as ‘She never thinks a Sermon good, unless she ride 
five Mile to Hear it’.25 However, the author substantially added to and changed Earle’s text, drawing 
attention to both the lack of polite fashion and the ill behaviour of those who pretended to piety. The 
result was that his ‘female hypocrite’ valued herself ‘for being neither in, nor out of the Fashion. She 
wears the best of Silks and Linnen…but dress so Odly, that she spoils her Shape, and the Make of her 
                                               
18 Edward Ward, The Modern World Disrob’d: or, Both Sexes Stript of their Pretended Vertue (London: 1708), p.8. 
19 See for instance, William Pittis, Aesop at Oxford: or, a Few Select Fables in Verse (London: 1708), pp.19-23; The 
World Display’d: or Mankind Painted in their Proper Colours (London: 1742), pp.69-71, 111-118. 
20 Peter Earle, Micro-Cosmographie, or, A Peece of the World Discovered in Essayes and Characters (London: 1628), 
sig.H5v. 
21 Ibid., sigs.H6r, H7r-v. 
22 Ibid., sigs.H7r, H7v. 
23 Ibid., sig.H8v. 
24 See for example, Mirth and Wisdom in a Miscellany of Different Characters, Relating to Different Persons and 
Perswasions (London: 1703), p.3. 
25 The True Characters (London: 1708), pp.7, 9. See Earle, Micro-Cosmographie, p.86. 
7 
 
Face by screwing it into the Model of Nonconformity’.26 Once again we see the hypocritical ill-humour of 
Dissenters represented as causing the double vice of, on the one hand, behaving hypocritically, and, on 
the other, failing to conform to social norms in public.  
 
There was also a gendered aspect to this particular theme of hypocrisy. Spiritual writers frequently 
suggested that women were more easily led astray because they tended towards willfulness and carnal 
reasoning.27 The view that women were more vulnerable in this way may have hardened in the 
eighteenth century as medical ideas about the distinctiveness of the female nervous system 
developed.28 This was particularly important in the context of criticism of Dissent, because, as Ann 
Hughes has shown through the example of relations between the Restoration nonconformist Richard 
Baxter and his wife, some Dissenting women were encouraged to voice their religious views more freely 
than their conforming counterparts.29 The choice made by authors of character literature to portray 
Dissent through a female figure may therefore have been both a criticism of the perceived freedom of 
expression of Dissenting women, and an attempt to reinforce the notion that Dissenters were 
particularly vulnerable to carnal hypocrisy. 
 
However, the visual culture of the period propounds the view that all Dissenters were simultaneously 
impolite, unfashionable, and hypocritical. This was a striking theme of the illustrative print to the 1729 
broadside, a Comical sonnet on Ch------s blue bonnet, which shows a non-conformist minister’s cap as 
covering two faces at once, thus representing hypocrisy (Figure 1). As the ballad which accompanies the 
woodcut indicates, the hat is more than just a feeble garment with which to attempt to hide the 
hypocritical faces of Dissent.30 It also embodies its sinful and low-born nature, hence how 
  
                                               
26 Ibid., p.7. 
27 Patricia Crawford, ‘Public Duty, Conscience, and Women in Early Modern England’, in John Morrill, Paul Slack, 
and Daniel Woolf (eds), Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays Presented to G. 
E. Aylmer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.70; Anthony Fletcher, ‘Beyond the Church: Women’s 
Spiritual Experience at Home and in the Community 1600-1900’ in R. N. Swanson (ed.), Gender and Christian 
religion, Studies in Church History, 34 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1998), p.188. 
28 G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility. Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago and 
London: Chicago University Press, 1992), pp.27-8; See also Karen Harvey, ‘The Substance of Sexual Difference: 
Change and Persistence in Representations of the Body in Eighteenth-Century England’, Gender and History 14:2 
(2002), pp.202-223. 
29 Ann Hughes, ‘Puritanism and Gender’ in John Coffey and Paul C. H. Lim (eds), The Cambridge Companion to 
Puritanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 300, 302. 
30 A Comical Sonnet on Ch----s Blue Bonnet (London: 1729), f.1r. 
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This Bonnet will sanctify Cobblers and Taylors, 
And make even Saints of Robbers and Jaylers; 
This Bonnet enlightens Black-smiths and Sow-gelders, 
And qualifies Weavers and Culters for Elders.31   
 
Indeed, it is suggested that as well as hiding two faces, the bonnet teaches the wearer to act ‘Just e’en 
as the present occasion may jump, / To move with the Head, or to wag with the Rump’.32 The bonnet 
thus allows even the criminal in society to pretend to sanctity whilst simultaneously training them up in 
the supposed seditious and fickle practices of Dissent, modelled by their Parliamentarian forefathers in 
the Civil Wars. In presenting this image, the Comical sonnet suggests a strong link between a visually 
recognisable aspect of Dissent and seditious hypocrisy. At the same time, it emphasises that Dissent and 
the divisive behaviour associated with it are outdated. This is no new hat, conforming to the style of the 
age: ‘The Fashion is Old’.33 Dissenters were once again simultaneously criticised for both hypocrisy and 
failure to conform to social and cultural norms. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1: Woodcut from A Comical sonnet on Ch------s blue bonnet (London: 1729). 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2: Woodcut illustration of the cloak referred to in A merry new joke, on Joseph’s old Cloak (London: 
1729). 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 3: The Turncoats (London: 1709-10). Etching and engraving on paper. 197 x 253mm. British Museum no. 
1868,0808.3422. 
                                               
31 Ibid., f.1v. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., f.1r. 
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This theme emerged in other visual depictions of Dissent. The Comical sonnet was a sequel to another 
ballad published earlier that year, entitled A merry new joke, on Joseph’s old Cloak (Figure 2). The ballad 
tells the story of how the cloak ‘cut in old Oliver’s Days’ had continued to be recut and used from the 
interregnum to the time of writing, and had so disintegrated as to be only fit to be made a bonnet. 
Throughout, the cloak is described as being used as a hypocritical cover for seditious acts:  
 
‘This Cloak to no Party was yet ever true, 
The Inside was Black, and the Outside was Blue: 
‘Twas smooth all without, and rough all within, 
A Shew of Religion, a Mantle to Sin’.34 
 
Its disintegration to scraps by the end of the ballad suggests that Dissent had lost all integrity. As with 
the bonnet, in this ballad the image of the cloak represents the sedition and hypocrisy of Dissenters. 
This three-way association between the appearance of Dissenters, the cloaking of truth through 
hypocritical behaviour, and apparent imperviousness to contemporary fashion is most clearly spelled 
out in the 1709 broadside The Turncoats, published in response to controversy over Dissenters’ practice 
of occasional conformity (Figure 3). In the print, the figure on the left asks his tailor whether he could 
‘make this Gown into a Cloak upon Occasion’; the tailor in the middle tells his customer in the short 
(nonconformist) cloak ‘let me take the length of your conscience’, and receives the reply ‘Let the Gown 
be lin'd with a Cloak to turn at pleasure’.35 In this scene, the outer clothing of the clergyman becomes a 
tool to indicate the status of his allegiance to the Church at his own convenience. Although the charge of 
hypocrisy in The turncoats does not apply exclusively to Dissenters, the implication is that allowing 
occasional conformity leads to moral vacuity, reducing religion to mere outward form. 
 
The message given by each of these prints is not just that the cloak and the hat represent the seditious 
hypocrisy taken on by Dissenters, but that they are clinging to an old, outdated, unfashionable way of 
thinking. In each case the Dissenting viewpoint is presented not just as hypocritical, but also entirely 
out-moded. By using these garments to represent the perceived hypocrisy of Dissent, the authors of 
these prints suggested not just that Dissenters were deceitful, but that they were unfashionably so. 
                                               
34 A Merry New Joke, on Joseph’s Old Cloak (London: 1729), f.1r. 
35 The Turncoats (London: 1709-1710). 
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In the context of the eighteenth century, the old charge of hypocrisy was sharpened by associations with 
impoliteness. However, this did not mean that if Dissenters conformed to polite, fashionable, behaviour 
they could escape criticism. Dissenters who subscribed to contemporary social norms might equally be 
regarded as hypocritical. Given that they claimed that their communion was more pious than that of the 
Church of England, if their behaviour was not discernibly different from others then their dissent from 
the Established Church was hard to justify. The Cheshire Presbyterian and prolific diarist Sarah Savage 
was made aware of this in June 1716, when her neighbour, Mr Wright, told her that he might be more 
persuaded to go to a Dissenters’ meeting with his wife ‘“if I could...see you any better for going”’.36 It 
was on these grounds that the author of a letter to The Gentleman’s Magazine in December 1747 
argued that ‘a change of our Church government for the Presbyterian, would be of no advantage 
towards the amendment of the manners of our present age’.37  
 
Expectations of polite behaviour presented a difficult problem for Dissenters. If they did not 
demonstrate difference from others in their behaviour, they risked the accusation that their separation 
from the Church of England was an unprincipled attempt to undermine stability and unity. As the writer 
and biographer Robert Sanders put it, ‘no person can, with the least degree of reason, dissent from the 
Established Church, unless it be with a view of being a better man, or a sincerer Christian’.38 If Dissenters 
did not show these attributes in their behaviour their dissent was pointless. While Dissenters who 
exhibited outward piety were, as we have seen, cast under suspicion of committing the dual vice of 
masking their impiety while behaving impolitely, failure to demonstrate outwardly pious behaviour 
could equally leave Dissenters open to charges of hypocrisy. Whatever stance they took with regard to 
contemporary social expectations, Dissenters could be labelled as hypocritical outsiders. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
36 Mrs Savage’s Diary, May 31st 1714 to December 25 1723 (C18th copy), Bodleian Library (Bod.), Oxford, MS. Eng. 
misc. e. 331, p. 105. 
37 Miscellaneous Correspondence: Containing Essays, Dissertations, &c...Sent to the Author of the Gentleman’s 
Magazine (London: 1742-1748), p.351. 
38 Robert Sanders, Lucubrations of Gaffer Graybeard. Containing Many Curious Particulars Relating to the Manners 
of the People in England, During the Present Age (London: 1774), p.78. 
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II 
 
Discourses of politeness and impoliteness could thus be used to perpetuate and transform the old 
charge of hypocrisy against Dissenters in the eighteenth century. The impact of this was further 
enhanced by changes in perceptions of hypocrisy itself. While some late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century discussions of hypocrisy began to show willingness to tolerate it in some circumstances, in the 
context of an emphasis on politeness and social conformity, the impolite hypocrisy of Dissenters 
remained beyond the pale. 
 
Studies of political and religious discourse in the later seventeenth- early eighteenth-centuries have 
suggested heightened concern about hypocrisy and the nature of truth in this period.39 The work of 
Mark Knights has been crucial in connecting this to the political and religious context of the time. 
Emphasising both the role of partisan dispute in creating ambiguity over the meaning of words and 
representations, and the extent to which religion became a tool of partisan polemic, he has 
demonstrated how religious and political diversity presented a challenge to established ideas about 
sincerity.40 Against this background, the threat that hypocrisy presented to social and political stability 
was a driving force in debates about the practice of occasional conformity to the Established Church and 
the political position of Dissenters in the first decade of the eighteenth century. Having long been an 
element of the “anti-Puritan” stereotype, the charge of hypocrisy was flung from all sides, reflecting ‘a 
perception that interest rather than conscience prevailed’.41 
 
Hypocrisy had numerous forms, some of which were regarded as more vicious than others. For many 
contemporaries hypocrisy remained an unacceptable vice. The novelist and dramatist Henry Fielding 
was clear in his Essay on the knowledge and characters of men (1743) that young people ought to be 
                                               
39 Kate Loveman, Reading Fictions, 1660-1740. Deception in English Literary and Political Culture (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2008), pp.3, 7-8; Jack Lynch, Deception and Detection in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2008), pp.1, 10. 
40 Mark Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain. Partisanship and Political Culture 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.22, 214-5; Mark Knights, The Devil in Disguise. Deception, 
Delusion, and Fanaticism in the Early English Enlightenment (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
p.7. 
41 Mark Knights, ‘Occasional Conformity and the Representation of Dissent: Hypocrisy, Sincerity, Moderation, and 
Zeal’, Parliamentary History 24:1 (2005), pp.49, 51. 
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protected from ‘the pernicious Designs of that detestable Fiend, Hypocrisy’, and taught to identify it in 
all its various personifications, including such characters as ‘A flatterer’, ‘a Promiser’, and ‘a Saint’.42 
Fielding would have approved of the mid-eighteenth-century commonplace book of John Tylston, 
Hannah Tylston, and Hannah Lightbody, Unitarian children from Liverpool, which drew on a selection of 
texts to give a damning definition of hypocrisy. Quoting ‘Brooks remedys’, originally published in 1661, 
the entry for hypocrisy notes ‘History speaks of a kind of witches that stirring a broad would put on their 
eyes, but returning home boxed them up again. So do Hypocrites.’43 “Hypocrisy” was generally regarded 
as a negative attribute; as Jenny Davidson highlights, even those who defended hypocrisy often did so 
under another name - manners, civility, decorum, politeness - because ‘To defend hypocrisy under its 
own name means breaking a taboo’.44 
 
Nevertheless, there were those who did just that. The justifications they gave, and the distinctions they 
made between different types of hypocrisy are essential to understanding the changing nature and 
impact of the label as applied to Dissenters. The first form of hypocrisy actively promoted by some 
contemporaries was that associated with outward conformity to the law. The notion that abiding by the 
law contrary to private belief is an acceptable form of hypocrisy had been supported in the mid-
seventeenth-century by Thomas Hobbes. He proposed that for subjects the only certain virtue was 
obedience to the law; disobedience to private conscience in aid of this end was therefore justifiable for 
the sake of the peace and stability of the state.45 Some elements of his argument can be seen in the 
justification of hypocrisy given by Jonathan Swift in his Project for the advancement of religion (1709). 
Swift’s view was that it was the Prince’s duty to make virtuous behaviour a qualification for public office 
in order to combat the spread of profanity. Acknowledging that ‘making Religion a necessary Step to 
Interest and Favour, might encrease Hypocrisy among us’, he advocated it on the grounds that it ‘is 
often with Religion as with Love; which by much dissembling, at last grows real’.46 Although Swift, unlike 
                                               
42 Henry Fielding, ‘An Essay on the Knowledge and Characters of Men’ in Henry Knight Miller (ed.), The Wesleyan 
Edition of the Works of Henry Fielding: Miscellanies by Henry Fielding, Esq, Vol. 1 (Oxford Scholarship Online, 
accessed 15 May 2017), pp.156, 164-7. 
43 Commonplace Book of John Tylston, with additions by Hannah Tylston and Hannah Lightbody, Bod.: MS. Eng. 
misc. d. 311, p.45. The original quote can be found in Thomas Brooks, Precious Remedies Against Satans Devices 
(London: 1661), p.105. 
44 Davidson, Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness, p.6. 
45 Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore Politico, or, The Elements of Law, Moral and Politick (London: 2nd edn, 1652), 
pp.130-1. 
46 Jonathan Swift, A Project for the Advancement of Religion and the Reformation of Manners (London: 1709), 
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Hobbes, was concerned about personal morality, he too justified hypocrisy in moral matters because 
even if it allowed for individual vice it would benefit the nation as a whole. Making virtue a qualification 
for office ‘would quickly make Vice so scandalous, that those who could not subdue, would at least 
endeavour to disguise it’.47 For both thinkers, rulers should encourage obedience and virtue in society. 
Individual hypocrisy was justifiable for this end. 
 
Swift was not alone in the early eighteenth century in promoting the idea that hypocrisy, while 
ultimately undesirable, could be a force for good. The Observator, a whig periodical established by the 
political writer John Tutchin, argued along very similar lines in April 1702 that ‘If all Prophane and 
Vicious Persons were...not suffer’d to enjoy Places of Profit and Trust, the powerful Argument of Interest 
would oblige Men to be Vertuous, or at least to seem so...the vile Hypocrite would only hurt himself, 
when otherwise, his open Prophaness would be Contagious’.48 Similarly, it was concluded in the 
periodical the British Apollo in November 1708 that profaneness was a greater sin than hypocrisy 
because ‘The Profane Despises all Religion, the Hypocrite thinks it Worth the Counterfeit’ and ‘The 
Profane makes Prosylites to Profaneness; the Hypocrite wou’d not be wanting to make Prosylites to 
Hypocrisy’.49 Hypocrisy was damaging for the individual, but profanity spread its malicious influence 
among society. If hypocrisy prevented profanity it was therefore justifiable. In the words of the 
Spectator in June 1712, ‘Hypocrisie cannot indeed be too much detested, but at the same time is to be 
preferred to open Impiety. They are both equally destructive to the Person who is possessed of them; 
but in regard to others, Hypocrisie is not so pernicious as bare-faced Irreligion.’50 
 
The principle that personal hypocrisy was acceptable in the name of wider social benefit was a key part 
of justifications of hypocrisy in social conduct. The most famous of these, Bernard Mandeville’s 
argument in The Fable of the Bees (1714) for ‘Private vices publick benefits’, suggested that it was 
socially useful to fake virtue, because while manners made for good personal relationships, vices 
promoted the commercial success of the kingdom.51 Genuine virtue, Mandeville argued, could be 
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damaging to a society that was stimulated by greed and pride.52 Hypocrisy was thus in some respects in 
the public interest. Mandeville’s view was a provocative one. He was widely condemned for promoting 
irreligion, and he should not be taken as representative of general attitudes to hypocrisy.53 However, 
while other advocates of the social benefits of manners in covering up vice were less brazen in their 
arguments, they did come close to suggesting that hypocrisy was justifiable as a lesser evil if it was for 
the benefit of others. This was seen in translation of the French conduct writer Jean Baptiste Morvan de 
Bellegarde, who, while condemning the ‘Hypocrisy of...counterfeit Politeness’, suggested that ‘If you 
can’t divest yourself of your bad Qualities…shrowd them from publick notice. Why will you have others 
suffer the Chagrin of your ill-humour..?’54 De Bellegarde’s statements are somewhat contradictory, 
reflecting the contemporary difficulty with squaring ideas about politeness and good manners with 
ideals of sincerity and truth.55 However, they resonate with other more explicit justifications of 
hypocrisy. Just as for Hobbes hypocrisy was permissible in the name of obedience to the law that 
maintained the peace of society, and for Swift hypocritical pretence to morality could be accepted if it 
promoted virtue across wider society, for de Bellegarde some level of hypocrisy in social behaviour 
might be justifiable to protect wider company from an individual’s morosity. 
 
Given that in the seventeenth century hypocrisy had been regarded by many as ‘the worst vice they 
could imagine’, where had this reluctant willingness (however patchy) to accept the benefits of some 
forms of hypocrisy come from?56 Like the discourse of politeness, it was in part a response to the events 
of the previous century. Some churchmen feared that reactions to the rigid hypocrisy of interregnum 
Puritans had led to open profanity, with the result that individuals no longer felt shame in declaring 
vice.57 Against this, hypocrisy might be regarded as the lesser of two evils. However, this did not mean 
that the perceived hypocrisy of the hotter sort of Protestant could be regarded as tolerable. This was 
made clear in the narrative of the anti-whig and anti-Dissenting nonjuror Charles Leslie, who wrote that 
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since the ‘Deluge of Enthusiasm’ that characterised the Interregnum, ‘Atheism has appeared barefaced, 
and the War is carried on, with the Help of the Confederate Sects, against all Religion in General. And 
open Blasphemy has succeeded Hypocrisy.’58 Hypocrisy was indeed the lesser evil, but for Leslie both 
hypocrisy and blasphemy were promoted by those who deviated from mainstream Protestantism. 
 
Hypocrisy was therefore in part being rehabilitated as a tool in the battle against open profanity, but 
Dissenters continued to be labelled negatively as hypocritical. This was possible because there were 
some types of hypocrisy that everyone considered unacceptable. Thus in An enquiry into the origin of 
honour (1732), Mandeville distinguished between ‘Fashionable hypocrites’, who go to Church without 
real devotion ‘from no other Principle than an Aversion to singularity, and a Desire of being in the 
Fashion’, and ‘Malicious hypocrites’, who ‘pretend to a great Deal of Religion, when they know their 
Pretensions to be false; who take Pains to appear Pious and Devout...in Hopes that they shall be 
trusted’.59 Malicious hypocrites gave false appearances for their own ends; fashionable hypocrites were 
merely seeking to fit the norms of society. This was not so far from Hobbes’s resolute condemnation of 
the hypocrisy of those who, during the Civil Wars, failed ‘to perceive that the Laws of the Land were 
made by the King, to oblige his Subjects to Peace and Justice’ and instead concealed the ultimate vice of 
disobedience to the state behind the language of godliness and piety.60 Hypocrisy could only ever be 
considered acceptable if it conferred a benefit on wider society. Hypocrisy purely for selfish ends was 
always condemned. The impolite hypocrisy ascribed to Dissenters fitted into this latter category. It was 
self-serving behaviour that sought to conceal impiety in an unmannerly fashion, the sort of hypocrisy 
that even Mandeville would have regarded as ‘malicious’.61 
 
III 
 
It is clear that the labels being applied to Dissenters in eighteenth-century England were not conducive 
to their smooth integration within wider society after the Toleration Act. Despite changes in 
understandings of hypocrisy, it was a charge that continued to be interpreted negatively in relation to 
                                               
58 Charles Leslie, View of the Times their Principles and Practices (London: 4 vols., 1708-9) Vol.1, Issue 250, 8 
October 1707. 
59 Bernard Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour (London: 1732), pp.201-2. 
60 Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, or, An Epitome of the Civil Wars of England, from 1640 to 1660 (London: 1679), 
p.163; Runciman, Political Hypocrisy, p.34. 
61 Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour, pp.201-2. 
16 
 
Dissent. Furthermore, against the backdrop of new discourses about politeness and fashionable 
conduct, Dissenters faced the additional problem of their hypocrisy being associated with impolite, 
outdated, and socially unacceptable behaviour. How then did this shape Dissenters’ behaviour as they 
adjusted to the limited legal “toleration” of 1689? 
 
Dissenters were highly sensitive to these criticisms, and this played heavily into internal debates about 
how they should behave in relation to the rest of society after the Toleration Act. In 1730 the Dissenter 
and controversialist Strickland Gough wrote that Dissenters might benefit from employing a dancing-
master at their academies, ‘to give them a gracefulness and gentility of address, and prune off all 
clumsiness and aukwardness that is disagreeable to people of fashion’.62 Gough had by 1735 taken Holy 
Orders within the Established Church, but his Enquiry into the causes of the decay of the Dissenting 
interest sparked debate among his Dissenting contemporaries.63 Arguing that Dissenting ministers had a 
poor understanding of their own principles and that they displayed a conduct that did little justice to 
their interests, he suggested that the primary objections to Dissent were based on ‘the aukwardness and 
impoliteness of our Preachers’, and that their cause would be strengthened if preachers adjusted their 
manner of address accordingly.64 The replies of leading Dissenting ministers to his suggestions were 
mixed. While they recognised the necessity of ensuring that Dissent was socially acceptable, writers 
such as Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge were concerned that emphasis on respectability and social 
conformity might endanger the distinctive identity of the Dissenting interest, leading to further decline 
of the cause and leaving it open to attacks from its opponents on the grounds of hypocrisy. Their 
arguments reveal Dissenters’ consciousness of the difficulty of balancing the need for integration with 
the maintenance of their distinctive identity after the Toleration Act. 
 
Strickland Gough’s suggestion that embracing politeness might be a way to counter the perceived 
decline of Dissent received some sympathy from those who replied to him in print. The 
Northamptonshire Independent minister Philip Doddridge acknowledged that ‘some care should be 
taken…to engage students to a genteel and complaisant behaviour’ on the basis that ‘the common 
people...are peculiarly pleas’d with the visits and converse of those, who they know may be welcome to 
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greater company’.65 Doddridge was wary of neglecting the need for socially appealing and polite 
behaviour. However, he denied that impoliteness was the reason behind the decline of Dissent. 
Politeness would not win back consciences ‘for those that are truly religious...attend of publick worship, 
not that they may be amused with a form or a sound...but that their hearts may be enlarged as in the 
presence of God’.66 Those who had conformed, he argued, had done so on the grounds of political 
interest, marriage, and a dislike of piety, not because Dissenters were ill-mannered.67 
 
Doddridge, alongside others, stressed instead that a pious manner of living was the only way of 
maintaining Dissent.68 The London Independent minister Abraham Taylor emphasised that ‘that which 
recommends…[ministers] to the greater part of our people, is the piety of their lives, and their plain, 
serious, and scriptural way of preaching’.69 Although in disagreement with Taylor over other matters, 
Southampton minister Isaac Watts supported this idea, arguing that Dissenters ought to be ashamed if 
they were found inferior to members of the Established Church ‘either in Virtue towards Men or Piety 
towards God’.70 Watts’s substantial work, attempting to revive ‘practical religion’ in the name of 
sustaining the Dissenting interest, set out clearly that the key element of Dissenting identity had to be 
their superior piety, asking his readers ‘What do all our Pretences to separation mean, if we ascend to 
no superior Degrees of Goodness?’.71 For Watts, Dissenters had to justify their continued Dissent by 
representing their religion in every aspect of their lives and behaviour: ‘your Goodness toward Men 
[ought to] distinguish you if possible from your Neighbours, as much as you are distinguished by your 
protest and publick Separation from their Forms or Worship’.72 Far from promoting politeness and 
integration by conformity to contemporary manners and fashions, Watts suggested that the survival and 
distinction of the Dissenting interest rested on rejecting them. 
 
What is evident on both sides of the debate, however, is that all parties were occupied with how to act 
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in a manner that would avoid playing into the hands of their critics. In particular, they were concerned 
that the mode of behaviour they promoted should not leave Dissenters vulnerable to charges of 
hypocrisy. This was spelled out clearly by Watts in his warning to Dissenters that keeping profane 
company and being taken along with the fashionable vices of the world would ‘give too just an Occasion 
to charge you with Hypocrisy’.73 Doddridge also opposed those who placed too great an emphasis on 
politeness on the grounds that ‘a cause may be ruin’d by learned and polite men, if, with their other 
furniture, they have not religion and prudence too’.74 Yet in many ways, Strickland Gough, who argued 
the opposite, was preoccupied with the same concerns. His desire to make preachers less censorious in 
their sermons would ensure both that ‘they would no longer terrify and frighten’ individuals from the 
church and that no-one had ‘an opportunity of complaining that they do not act consistently with their 
principles’.75 Gough, Watts, and Doddridge were all worried about how to maintain the Dissenting 
interest’s distinctive identity while avoiding being criticised on the grounds of hypocritical behaviour. 
Doddridge and Watts proposed that the Dissenting cause was based on their claim to practical religion 
and piety, and that they thus had to observe a strictness in their conduct. In contrast, Gough argued that 
Dissenters should not claim greater piety than others, instead emphasising their adherence to the cause 
of liberty and the need to demonstrate graceful and agreeable religion. The Dissent envisaged by Watts 
and Doddridge was one that avoided hypocrisy by maintaining the strict standards of piety it made claim 
to; in Gough’s scheme Dissenters avoided hypocrisy by denying claims to higher piety in the first place.  
 
This debate highlights how the label of hypocrisy as applied to Dissenters after 1689 had an important 
impact on their self-perception. The desire to avoid hypocrisy was crucial in determining Dissenters’ 
attempts to define their identity and maintain their cause after they had been granted a degree of legal 
toleration. Centring on the need for Dissenters to show simultaneously that they were grateful for the 
liberty of conscience that they had been granted, that they posed no threat to civil society, and that they 
still had a distinctive identity, this debate threw the old charge of hypocrisy into a new cultural context 
in which an emphasis on politeness created greater need for social conformity. This heady mix of new 
social demands, old stereotypes, and changing ideology created a background against which it was 
particularly challenging for Dissenters to create a distinct or unified cause. 
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There may have been a temptation in published debates for Dissenting Ministers to exaggerate the 
difficulties that Dissenters faced in order to reignite zeal for their cause in a period when Dissenters’ 
religion no longer brought them danger to life and liberty. However, this sensitivity to hypocrisy and the 
belief that it was more incumbent upon Dissenters than others to lead a demonstrably pious life is also 
evident in the accounts of individual Dissenters. The young Presbyterian diarist, Anne Dawson, for 
instance, recorded numerous occasions when she was ashamed of her conduct because she believed 
that she, as a Dissenter, should know better. She wrote on 9 October 1721 that although she was 
grateful that her education had prevented her from cursing, swearing, and obscene discourse, she had 
often indulged in sinful jesting, lying, and had caused sin in others through her words, stating ‘I who 
ought to have been an example of piety to others have instead of that incoraged to sin with the lips Lord 
humble me for it’.76 Dawson placed great emphasis throughout her diary on pious conduct that was 
different to that of the rest of the world. Her determination to retain a Christian character free from 
hypocrisy is further evident in her entry for 9 May 1722, when she was contemplating breaking off her 
courtship with a man who she felt had been dishonest, writing that ‘it is my earnest endeavour to cary 
well to him & if I do cast him of to do it like a Christian & not in anger and passion no I abhor such a 
carriage in others & will not do it my self’.77 For Anne Dawson, her aspiration to a truly Christian identity 
was defined against the danger of hypocrisy. At the other end of life, the prolific diarist Sarah Savage 
also demonstrated awareness of the danger that any sign of hypocrisy posed to Dissenters. Writing in 
1743, in her 78th year, she expressed concern at the behaviours of the followers of Wesley, some of 
whom had attended her Presbyterian meeting. She described how they ‘Pretend to the Spirit, & its 
Motions’, and felt that it ‘’tis too True that Religion is Wounded by such as we thought its Friend’.78 
Savage was keen that what she saw as the hypocritical pretences of the Methodists be not mixed up 
with the religion of her congregation. 
 
Savage’s brother, the prominent Presbyterian minister Matthew Henry, was equally concerned that he 
avoid the label of hypocrisy, and his diary and letters to his father show numerous occasions on which 
he fought against it. He was highly censorious of drunkenness, to the extent that he showed little 
sympathy for those who died or were injured as a result of their inebriation.79 His willingness to 
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challenge ‘obstinate Drunkeness’ may have been the motivation behind false accusations that he 
himself had fallen into drink, brought against him in the 1690s.80 Faced in court with the testimony of a 
number of witnesses to Henry’s sobriety, his accusers ‘solemly profess’d…that there was not the least 
ground or footstep of truth in the Story’. Henry was anxious that his name be cleared, and noted that 
the outcome of the case had been recorded ‘in the Book’, sending a copy to his father. His relief was 
apparent in his comment that the verdict ‘I trust may tend to the furtherance of the Gospel, especially 
to remove an objection commenly made against the Testimony I desire upon all occasions to bear 
against Drunkenness’.81 Henry’s attempts to enforce sobriety in his local area were clearly not popular, 
and the false charges against him appear in this context to look like a concerted attempt to label him a 
hypocrite. Henry was acutely aware of the damage that this could do not only to his personal 
reputation, but to the cause of the Dissenters in general. Piety was both a badge of distinction, and 
integral to the reputation of the Dissenting cause. 
 
This was not to say that Dissenters necessarily shied away from praising polite behaviour. Indeed, 
funeral sermons of ministers often mentioned their polite comportment. However, they were also 
careful to emphasise that this politeness came from inner goodness rather than observance of social 
norms, and that it should not take precedence over godliness. Thus in his account of the life of the Irish 
Presbyterian Minister Michael Bruce, fellow Presbyterian James Kirkpatrick wrote that ‘He was a 
gentleman of polite manners and address, and of a most generous spirit’, but also stressed that ‘the 
imitation of God consists principally in goodness...A careful observer must have seen in him, that if he 
had not been genteely educated, yet the goodness of his heart would have made him a well bred man; 
an ingenuous disposition to oblige every one, would have produced effects of the same kind in him, that 
politeness does in others’. 82 Bruce’s polite education was incidental; his conduct was a product of his 
innately godly disposition. 
 
However, Dissenters might find themselves capitulating to the need to be polite under social pressure, 
and this was far less laudable. It caused considerable anxiety for some individuals who were concerned 
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that they were both betraying their pious cause, and exposing themselves to the accusation of 
hypocrisy. This is suggested by the words of Savage in January 1717, when she recorded that ‘we dined 
at Wrenbury Hall with Mr Voice, a splendid entertainment, - I envy not the great man state more inward 
satisfaction with a good Book in my own Closet that with all the Visits, modes, & forms, &c. yet think it 
duty to be friendly & respectful to those who are so to us’.83 She was cautious about showing too much 
enthusiasm for this presumably lavish affair, emphasising that, despite her willingness to attend the 
occasion, she engaged with ‘modes and forms’ out of duty rather than preference.  
 
This sense of internal conflict with regard to social conduct is also present in Anne Dawson’s account. 
She who lamented her frequent failures to exhibit suitably pious behaviour in the company of others: on 
19 May 1722 she reflected that ‘If I take a View of my carrage this Week I must be ashamed of it tho I 
have not spent mush of it in idleness yet I have spent it in trifling and visiting...I am oft forced to look 
back on most of my visets with a sort of a regret’, wishing that ‘serious or at least Profitable Discourse 
was more in fashion in this Gentel age’.84 Dawson found social visits troubling; the implication is that she 
both found it difficult to act contrary to fashion while in company, and lamented that her social 
discomfort was not eased by more godly conversation. At the same time as they were eager to promote 
the piety of the Dissenting cause, social realities could prove difficult for individuals to navigate. 
 
Concerns about the socially divisive nature of Dissent were not, as we have seen, new to the eighteenth 
century. However, contemporary advice on Dissenters’ conduct, particularly that given in printed 
sermons, suggests that Dissenters were now reading the dangers of the label of hypocrisy with the 
effects of the Toleration Act in mind. Such sermons not only reminded Dissenters that behaviour that 
could be interpreted as hypocritical was potentially damaging to the Dissenting interest, but also that 
relationships between Dissenters and members of the Established Church within smaller communities 
could be broken down by hypocritical action. Furthermore, it is clear that this was advice that was 
perceived to be particularly suitable in the wake of the Toleration Act.  
 
In 1734 a Newcastle Dissenting minister, William Wilson, reminded his congregation that the ‘mild and 
gentle’ laws of the country which ‘give every one of us Liberty to chuse our own Ministers’ meant that 
his congregation had to be careful to respect that liberty in others, lest power fall into the hand of their 
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opponents, who might ‘justly...say, what Reason have you to expect Liberty from us, when ye take it 
from one another’.85 Advising his congregation on what might serve the maintenance of the Dissenting 
interest in this context, he claimed that ‘serious Religion is its chief Support...if these things fail among 
us; if our People grow loose and formal, or their Ministers become remiss and superficial in their 
Performances...no lasting Establishment can be expected to our Cause. Without Piety, a Dissenter, any 
Dissenting Congregation, nay, the Interest itself, I humbly conceive, scarce deserves a Name’.86 For 
Wilson in the wake of the Toleration Act it was not viable to attempt to promote the Dissenting interest 
by suggesting that others were wrong, for that could only lead to accusations of hypocrisy. Instead, 
Dissenters had to mark out their distinctiveness through a demonstration of their sincere piety. Like 
Doddridge and Watts, Wilson believed that a dedicated and unblemished record of practical religiosity 
was the only way to demonstrate the validity of Dissent. 
 
Wilson was not alone in reminding congregations of Protestant Dissenters to be grateful for liberty of 
conscience and avoid the hypocrisy of denying it to others. The sermon of Lancashire Dissenting minister 
Samuel Bourn to a congregation in Dudley, Worcestershire, in 1738, celebrated that the Church of 
England had given up the ‘terrible principles’ of ‘Calling conscientious Christians by ill Names, only for 
their upright Opinions, and teaching the way of Truth; and then doing to them ill Things to incapacitate 
and disqualify them for publick Service’, by allowing liberty of conscience. However, he also warned 
Protestant Dissenters against getting left behind in this respect by continuing to rail against those of a 
different profession, reminding the congregation to ‘Let not Protestant Dissenters be the last who open 
their Eyes, the last in throwing off this Remnant of Popery’.87 Bourn presented the Toleration Act as an 
important moment for Dissenters in allowing them liberty, but he also recognised that it created new 
risks that Dissenters might demonstrate a hypocritical attitude towards those from which they differed.  
 
This view was equally evident in the sermon of Benjamin Mills given at Maidstone, Kent, in 1741, in 
which he encouraged his hearers and readers to ‘carry [y]ourselves in so strictly, loyal, and peaceable a 
Manner, that we may hereby conciliate’, rather than appearing sour about the remaining privileges that 
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were barred to them under the law.88 For these ministers, the change in the status of Dissent under the 
law made attention to the danger of hypocrisy particularly important, not just for the reputation of 
Dissent, but for maintaining their liberty.89 More than ever, therefore, the onus was on Dissenting 
congregations to ensure that the lives they lived were peaceable and pious, justifying both their 
separation from the Established Church, and their “toleration” under the law. The emphasis on 
conciliation suggests awareness that their behaviour needed to be consonant with the supposedly 
inclusive polite discourse of the age. Dissenters navigated social and religious expectations in a variety of 
ways in this period, but issues of hypocrisy and politeness were central to all. 
 
IV 
 
Many of the legal, social, and political changes of the first half of the eighteenth century appear, at first 
glance, to have been highly favourable to the fortunes of Protestant Dissent. The Toleration Act of 1689, 
albeit still limited in its provision, had tacitly acknowledged some degree of religious pluralism as 
inevitable. For the first time, the worship of Protestant Dissenters was protected under the law. 
Furthermore, modes of discussion and labels used to describe Dissent were subject to changing 
meanings and contexts. Hypocrisy, a charge long levelled against Puritans and nonconformists, and 
regarded as the ultimate vice for much of the seventeenth century, was beginning to be regarded by 
some as acceptable in certain contexts. In addition, the increasing dominance of discourses of 
“politeness” and “moderation” in reaction to ’the socially disruptive impact of religion in the 
seventeenth century’90 would be expected to have acted as a discouragement to the social 
marginalisation or abuse of Dissenters. 
 
A closer look at the changing impact of accusations of hypocrisy against Dissenters demonstrates that 
this was not necessarily the case. As has been emphasised elsewhere, legal toleration was by no means 
universally welcome, and its critics continued to fight to limit the provisions of the 1689 Act as far as 
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possible.91 What this article has emphasised, however, is the extent to which alongside attempts to limit 
the legal and political rights of Dissenters, languages of social interaction also continued to be tools for 
exclusion. The label of hypocrisy was applied to Dissenters in this period with reference to ideals of 
politeness, suggesting that far from promoting inclusivity and limiting religious divisions, politeness 
could be used to emphasise difference. This was evident in the double-sided criticism faced by 
Dissenters with regard to their social conduct. On the one hand, ostensibly pious behaviour was now 
being discussed not just in terms of its probable hypocrisy, but as a symptom of Dissenters’ 
impoliteness. On the other hand, Dissenters who failed to distinguish themselves significantly from 
others in their social behaviour could be regarded as hypocritical in their supposedly principled Dissent 
from the Established Church. From this angle, it appears that it was nearly impossible for Dissenters 
both to conform to emerging social expectations and avoid the charge of hypocrisy. 
 
The particular difficulty of managing this dual threat after the Toleration Act was reflected in Dissenters’ 
comments on their behaviour after 1689. The need to balance social integration with distinguishing the 
cause of Dissent through pious behaviour is apparent through the debates among leading ministers 
about the role that polite conduct should play in their ministry, and in the reactions of individual 
Dissenters to the awkward demands that social situations could place on them. The immense sensitivity 
of Dissenters to these concerns suggests that, contrary to its pretences to inclusivity, when combined 
with the charge of selfish hypocrisy the language of politeness could in fact be highly exclusive, acting to 
emphasise rather than brush over religious divides. Politeness was only inclusive insofar as individuals 
were able to subscribe to its ideals. 
 
Politeness was not, of course, the only mode of social interaction in the eighteenth century. As Kate 
Davison has highlighted, we should be wary of creating dichotomies of polite-impolite behaviour, when 
the reality was that individuals adapted a much wider social register to a variety of contexts. It was in 
fact possible for ‘multiple and often contradictory behaviours to co-exist’; politeness was but one of 
them.92 In this sense, an analysis of attitudes towards Protestant Dissenters exclusively through the 
languages of hypocrisy and politeness paints a picture that is too black and white, emphasising inclusion 
                                               
91 Thompson, ‘Contesting the Test Act’, p. 61. 
92 Kate Davison, ‘Occasional Politeness and Gentlemen’s Laughter in Eighteenth-Century England’, Historical 
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and exclusion as opposites when the reality was much murkier, involving coterminous ideas about 
neighbourliness, civility, and trust. What it does highlight, however, is the extent to which even social 
languages that ostensibly promoted harmony could be manipulated to perpetuate and reinterpret the 
religious questions that had so catastrophically divided the country in the previous century. It suggests 
that, much as proponents of politeness might have liked to pretend otherwise, it is difficult to 
understand the operation of the multiple social registers of the eighteenth century without keeping 
underlying religious divisions in mind. 
